



NEWSLETTER ISSUE N° 10  
JULY 2009

## SOMMAIRE

Edito

The security issue on a humanitarian mission

Central African Republic, Sudan and Chad: porous borders bind three conflicts in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.

In Brief

## Edito

by Patrick Verbruggen -Triangle G H Codirector

***The main objectives of an ISO are to provide relief to the civil population in order to meet its basic needs, when the State it depends on is unable to cope.***

In the late 1970's, the "without borders" associations flourished on this basis. In a context of assistance to civil population, they stood for the necessity of global access to the victims, the total independence towards any form of power, of political or religious influence. They mainly relied on non-institutional funds.

In the early 1990's, changes occurred faster, each new major crisis leading towards important innovations in the practical and ethical fields. Paradoxically, it is in Sudan in 1989 that a government gave for the first time access to humanitarian assistance to a region held by the rebels (the Popular Movement to Free Sudan or PMFS). Both parties accepted not to hinder the efforts of a pool of approximately forty non governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, who intended to support innocent populations within the framework of the operation "Lifeline Sudan". Whereas the situation seemed to be desperate, tens of thousands of lives have been saved.

In 1990, in Iraqi Kurdistan, coalition forces delimited a «protected zone» within a sovereign country in order to protect Kurd populations. Some governments have since qualified their military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan as «purely humanitarian», thus leading to the confusion between the roles and objectives of political and military actors on the one side and humanitarian actors on the other side. This raises serious problems in terms of perception of the neutrality of humanitarian assistance.

The tragic incidents which occurred in the past years, such as the bombing of the U.N. peacekeeping forces camp in Baghdad in August 2003, the murder of 17 staff members of the French NGO (Action against Hunger) in Sri Lanka in 2006, or the humanitarian workers taken as hostages in Somalia or recently in Sudan lead ISO to give further thought to the issue of the security of expatriates. It has always been to carry out humanitarian activities in armed conflict or violence stricken areas has always been dangerous. At any time of the day, humanitarian workers are asked to enter the scenes where fights took place, or to cross the front lines between opposing parties. They meet various weapon carriers, ranging from soldiers to police officers, from paramilitary forces to rebels, from child soldiers to mercenaries. They also have to face acts of violence which are not related to conflicts (sexual attacks, armed robbery, harassment...) whereas they are striving to help the needy populations.

However, even though insecurity is often related to circumstances that NGOs have no hold on, its impact can be reduced through the learning of a behaviour adapted to different eventualities.

We obviously needed to set-up the basis of a well-defined and evolving institutional framework, sustained by the experience gathered on the field, and aiming at helping humanitarian workers to avoid some pitfalls potentially leading to perilous situations.

The following factors are necessary for the good management of the security conditions on the field: consistency of the programmes carried out, adequate practices from the actors on the field as well as their capacity to communicate with the beneficiary populations.

***« The fact that the young men and women who come to these regions in order to bring assistance become targets is unacceptable and really dismaying. They are not at war with anyone. They are there because they want to help; they are there because they feel compassion, they are there because they understand human condition and they want to do all that is in their power to help. The fact that these human beings become targets for the rebels or for governmental forces waging wars against each other is unforgivable.»***

Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations.



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## The security issue on a humanitarian mission

By Matthieu Lacourt - Security Consultant

### General Points

**Before moving to the subject of security management in humanitarian fields, it is appropriate to give a definition of the word «security» and to delimit its scope.**

What do we mean by « security»? In everyday life, this term inspires us with a reassuring feeling of control over our environment and the outside elements evolving in it. «Feeling safe» supposes that we have a complete knowledge of our environment and of the people who surround us. It would sound quite strange, or at least a little presumptuous, for example to say: «I feel safe in this town where I just settled and where I know no one».

**Discover, apprehend, get familiar with, ... those are as many successive steps punctuating the life of a humanitarian worker, and enabling him to adapt progressively to a strange environment**

A time of adaptation is always necessary in order to hold enough cards in hand to develop habits, reflexes and to « feel at home ».

In the given example, that time would be used to apprehend one's new environment, to distinguish the « welcoming » streets from the ones to « avoid », to meet the neighbours, their sensitiveness and their moods (good or bad), to get to know one's new colleagues, one's hierarchical superior and one's subordinates, their moods, their qualities and defects...

Discover, apprehend, get familiar with, ... those are as many successive steps punctuating the life of a humanitarian worker, and enabling him to adapt progressively to a strange environment, in a part of the world which was almost untraceable on a map a few weeks before.

### The shock of cultures

The spectrum of the contexts and threats present on humanitarian fields is wide and diversified. Armed conflict, mined field, road accident, breaking-in, theft, armed attack are as many threats hanging over the heads of humanitarian workers, who, as we may recall, are often coming from a totally different environment.

Can you imagine a 24 years old young man, who grew up in France in an environment that we could label "Western", with all it implies in terms of comfort and quality of life, finding himself landed overnight for his first mission in a camp of displaced people in Darfur, and having to deal with populations who have lost all they had, with the chiefs of armed groups protecting their interests, government representatives more or less committed to the humanitarian cause, and cheikhs, traditional chiefs... all of this in a different language, English most of the time, which is not completely mastered by any of the parties. The challenge soon proves to be sizeable! However, it is accepted by thousands of humanitarian workers sent abroad everyday on punctual or chronic emergencies as well as on so called "development" missions.



Children of the refugee camp of Bindizi (Darfur). Photography by Didier Dematons



Refugee Camp of Ryad (El Geneina - Darfur). Photography by Cédric Breda / Sudanese rebels of the JEM (Movement for the Justice and the Equality) – photography by UNAMID (UN)



### To manage the gap

Security management can not be approached suitably without constant humility and respect. It is necessary, even vital indeed, to place one's marker. The pieces of advice provided to future humanitarian workers on the leave are disconcerting by their obviousness:

- **One should not arrive as in a « conquered land »,** but one should take the time to immerse oneself in the new atmosphere. To have read a book on Sri Lanka or to have a Master in history does not provide all the

necessary clues to understand the Tamil cause. To believe that we **know** even before having landed in Colombo is, on the contrary, the best way to start with a prejudiced vision, which is totally incompatible with the principle of impartiality inherent to the humanitarian cause.

- **Respect the habits and local customs**, may they be religious, cultural or of any other sort, and may they meet our agreement or not. It is crucial to always keep in mind that we came on a voluntary basis in a country to help a population in need, and that we are not "at home".
- **Try to merge into the local population** by adopting a low profile, knowing that, no matter what, eyes will be turned on us and that the labels "humanitarian" or "Western" are not always favourable to us.

#### The impact of expatriates' behaviour on security

The following mistake is too often repeated in security management: the one to believe that security is only related to elements external to the NGO (context, conflicting parties, government...), as if the NGO had no influence, no interaction with these external elements.

In daily security management, we need to make a distinction between **safety** (set of rules and practices implemented to limit accidents whose causes are «internal» to the NGO) and **security** (set of rules and practices implemented to limit accidents whose causes are «external» to the NGO).

Let us take a few examples to clarify this shade of meaning:

- A car accident occurring while you were driving too fast, and during which the passenger, who did not wear his seatbelt, went through the windscreen, is directly imputable to you. You are thus the cause of an accident that could obviously have been avoided with an adapted speed and the wearing of a safety belt.
- One of your teams is working in a camp of displaced people when, suddenly, governmental planes appear in the air bombing the camp supposedly hosting rebels even if objectively hosting only men and women. You were not a direct target; you could not have foreseen such an event or even have tried to stop it by any means. It is therefore an event totally independent from your humanitarian activities, and in that case you are a victim of the environment in which you are evolving.

**The following mistake is too often repeated in security management: the one to believe that security is only related to elements external to the NGO**

#### Concrete actions implemented on humanitarian missions:

Once the adaptation phase is over, there is a need to be proactive and aware of the context evolutions, of the moves of armed groups, of the way people behave, etc... This is important in order not to enter a dangerous phase of **Routine**, considered as one of the main enemies in security management.

We encourage the respect of a certain number of rules:

- **The follow-up of a context:** The approach and understanding of a context is efficient and useful only if its evolutions are followed-up daily. Meetings, with other NGOs and UN agencies among others, enable the sharing of pieces of information from different networks, the spotting of forerunner signs of conflict resumption, etc.
- **The raising of staff awareness:** the way to react to an incident can and must be anticipated. The teams should be aware of the right practices to adopt under any circumstances. For example they must know what behaviour to adopt while facing a roadblock improvised by child-soldiers under the influence of drugs, or during a breaking-in at night in an inhabited place. Being prepared for such eventualities happens to be of great help once facing a "fait accompli". Of course, the watchword is to stay alive by all means, even though one has to give the key to the car or to the safe. Equipment should not cost a live.
- **Rules linked to moves on the field:** car accidents being the first cause of expatriates' death on a mission, the following rules need to be scrupulously applied: wear a safety belt, respect speed limitations, respect the curfew, always move in a convoy formed of a minimum of two vehicles. These rules punctuate the humanitarian worker's everyday life.
- **Rules linked to the protection of the buildings:** all types of measures must be considered: the presence and the training of watchmen day and night ensures the control over the in and outs of the house / the office / the warehouses where equipment for the beneficiary populations is stocked, the lighting of the proximity of the premises in countries where the risk of breaking in at night is high, the existence of protection measures such as barbed wire overhanging raised walls, the relevance of having a bunker ready to host humanitarian workers during 3-4 days in complete autarky (water, food, means of communication, etc.).
- **Rules linked to money management:** The procedures to supply money to the field, the necessity to have a safe, the rules concerning the payment of the salaries (payment by check rather than in cash in order to avoid the storage of money susceptible of attracting the greeds).

**Health-related procedures:** The necessity to « impose » holidays on humanitarian workers often working over twelve hours a day, 6 or even 7 days a week, is often under-estimated, but it must be taken seriously. The climatic conditions can be extreme, the hygiene situation precarious, and altogether it may favour the contraction of tropical diseases such as malaria. These conditions are hard on the body and endanger the staff.



Road between Um Dukhum and Bindizi (Darfur). Photography by Didier Dematons / Flights UNHAS\* for the travels of the Humanitarian workers in Darfur. Photography by Cédric Breda

**Routine, considered as one of the main enemies in security management**

#### Conclusion

Culturally speaking, humanitarian action spreads in countries most of which are quite different from the ones we know, with unfamiliar ways of thinking, habits and customs. The access to the beneficiary populations and the relevance of the programmes we implement depend on the understanding and respect of these differences.

Finally, security management could be defined by a series of rules, procedures and good practices, gathered in a sort of « code of conduct » adapted to each country, to each area of intervention according to its intrinsic specificities.

These rules, procedures and good practices are the guarantee of a humanitarian aid that will be delivered to the beneficiary populations according to their needs, but also according to the reality of the fields where we operate. It is better to postpone an action because of an identified potential threat rather than to put our teams in danger.

To know more about it:

[http://humanitarianprotection.org/AID\\_WORKER\\_SAFETY/aid\\_worker\\_safety.html](http://humanitarianprotection.org/AID_WORKER_SAFETY/aid_worker_safety.html)

\* United-Nation Humanitarian Air Service

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In Brief

## Central African Republic, Sudan and Chad: porous borders bind three conflicts in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.

 By *Félicie Monneret - Triangle G H Deputy Desk Officer*

*Triangle teams have been operating respectively for five and three years in Darfur and Central African Republic. They live in the heart of the conflicts in eastern Chad, Darfur and in the extreme North-East of CAR. The belligerents – their origins and the means they use –, as well as the humanitarian crisis they induce, ominously cross the borders of each concerned State.*

If the form of the conflict is new from the analysts<sup>1</sup> point of view, the close examination of their origins unmistakably brings them together, even though the political fights which triggered them were initially national issues.

The building of colonial empires at the beginning of the twentieth century set up administrative frontiers causing the division of territories formerly united in the exploitation of natural resources and trade between people living in Darfur, eastern Chad and the Vakaga region (North-East of CAR). Widely covered by historians, this phenomenon generated conflicts of power seriously destabilizing for young States who recently gained their independence (Sudan in 1956, Chad and CAR in 1960); Besides, the later well-known participation of France and Libya in their internal affairs highly contributed to the arming of the putschists, in Chad as in CAR, in the following decades. Sudan has an administration divided into North and South. By conceding power to the Arab elite of the North, Great Britain already planted the seeds of the conflict which germinated a few years later in the country, at the beginning of the oil exploitation. North and South are currently still opposed.



**The actual frontiers between these three countries are at present merely administrative as they are porous and divide territories formerly united in many respects**

Regional diplomacy added to the more or less discreet support of the different rebel and/or political groups of neighbouring countries by the Chadian, Sudanese and Central African States, contributed in many ways to the political upheavals in these three countries: we can mention the NLFC<sup>2</sup> which led to the downfall of François Tombalbaye (the first Chadian President); the well-known support of the Sudanese government to the Chadian rebels nowadays united within the UFR striving to take the power in Idriss Déby (a Zaghawa ethnic group); or even the logistical support brought by the Chadian government to the Sudanese rebels of the MJE<sup>3</sup> and the SLA<sup>4</sup> as well as to the newly-born military group of CJP<sup>5</sup> in the North-East of CAR. And finally, we can mention the strategic use of the Central African territory as a preparation and back-up zone for the Southern rebels of the SPLA during the fights opposing them to the regular Sudanese Army since 1983 in Bahr el-Ghazal.



*Sudanese rebels of the JEM – photography by UNAMID (UN)*

Furthermore, the three regions at stake here share socio-economic characteristics: they are all inhabited by a

multitude of different ethnic groups historically cross-border, located in the administrative and economic centres of their respective States, hosting a majority of Muslim populations, living on the products of farming and extensive breeding (nomadism is very developed, as it is in Sahelian regions). The very low level of development in Darfur, the Vakaga Region and Eastern Chad, even though not fully comparable, generated political claims coming from their inhabitants. These tensions added to the vague impulse for power of community leaders. Populations quickly organized themselves in politico-military groups against the central power administering them. Nevertheless we may not risk to directly link in time each of these three conflicts (Darfur in 2003, Chad in 2005, CAR in 2006).

As we said above, the actual frontiers between these three countries are at present merely administrative as they are porous and divide territories formerly united in many respects. The populations of the Region mainly live around the commercial centres of Nyala (South Darfur, Sudan) and Abéché (Ouaddaï, Chad). We can find the same populations and ethnic groups in Darfur, South-Eastern Chad and in the Vakaga Region: Nomads, whose socio-economical and identity survival is closely linked to their movements, as they transit from the South to the North every year at the beginning of the rainy season, disregarding administrative frontiers, looking for green pastures and fleeing the epizooties of too humid austral zones. And finally, Chadian migrations towards Darfur in the early 80's, fleeing civil war and the draught, highlighted the conflicting problematic of access to natural resources in the area.

This problematic pre-existed to the current conflicts. It is nowadays fully exacerbated by an easy political use, offering a simplistic analytical shortcut and a ready-made reason for the pursuit of the conflicts, reviving tensions especially between farmers and breeders in Darfur. Access to resources remains a central issue at stake in the Region. The migration of the Zaghawas, semi-nomad breeders present in Chad and in Sudan, is a living illustration of that. They had to flee their land towards the South in the 70's in order to find water for their cattle, and their economy partly shifted towards the trade of farming products. Their quest for territory opposed them to Fours and Birgids populations among others, whose claim for their lost territory – and through the political use made of it – added further to the current conflict in Darfur.

If the causes of this regional conflict are polymorphic as we have seen, the morphology of its unfolding is as complex. The regional diplomatic conflicts related to international economical issues (the presence of oil in the South of Sudan and in eastern Chad and its exploitation by French, British and Chinese companies among others), inter-ethnic tensions, the question of access to water, to arable land or to pasturage areas: all these issues are as many elements used by one or the other parties to pursue its own interests in a increasingly complex context. Years of conflict generated a complex situation with the multiplication of military groups and their claims changing with the wind, and created a cross-border war economy with shared human and logistic means exchanged between regular armies and even between rebel groups; the latter are often mercenaries whose sole economical objective is satisfied by the lootings they are asked to do in villages and in camps of displaced people. Regular armies and rebel groups defend their territories often separated by « grey zones ». These areas are apparently not controlled by any force, but they are non-permanently occupied by those wanting to settle there temporarily. Very often, civil populations fled these fighting zones, leaving the place to well-armed farmers coming to cultivate or harvest their fields; to Nomads enjoying these vast and empty pastures; or to groups of thieves / mercenaries hiding there, rising their camp, preparing their troops for future attacks. Front lines are thus inexistent or at least very changing, and the attacks hardly predictable, the groups being so numerous and their objectives following short-time logics.

Designating a great regional winner today would be absurd. However, we can easily say that civil populations living in the area are the great losers of this conflict, regarding their growing precariousness and the social changes they are subjected to.

**Beyond all of this, it is also the dignity of these people that is being spoiled by the total lack of intimacy in these improvised camps; the exactions on some victims who can not talk about it; the incapacity to help one's relatives; the incapacity for parents to feed their children...**

Torn away from their land and traditional ways of living, separated by the use of violence, forced to move away by way of terror during the attack of their village, the families of the region are reduced to bare survival today. They are crammed in camps for displaced people and refugees, hidden under trees in the bush trying not to go too far away from their land, or hosted by relatives in bigger cities. Without any resource, hundreds or thousands of families settle under trees close to a water supply spot (where water is usually scarce and unfit for consumption), often after several days of walking contributing to deteriorating the health condition of the weakest (the elderly, children, pregnant women). Beyond all of this, it is also the dignity of these people that is being spoiled by the total lack of intimacy in these improvised camps; the exactions on some victims who can not talk about it; the incapacity to help one's relatives; the incapacity for parents to feed their children...



*In the refugee camp of Um Dukhum. Photography by Didier Dematons*

The high concentration of people in some camps generates acute sanitary risks, directly related to, and dangerously increased by: the complete destitution of these populations; the lack of drinkable water; and the weak health condition of everyone. Since the beginning of the conflict, the international community and national solidarity organizations have been striving to respond to the « basic needs » of these people (food, drink and shelter). The task is becoming increasingly complex because of the opacity of the conflict and the rapid and permanent transfers of population seeking for safer places to settle.

It is nowadays extremely difficult for humanitarian organizations to invest a shrinking « humanitarian space ». The latter is defined by three factors: the existence of humanitarian needs (unprecedented in the region, considering its scope and acuteness); the security of the aid workers as the one of the beneficiaries in the implementation of the programme; the availability of adapted means (human, logistic and financial). If the unfolding of this war is violent and opaque, the declared use of the logistic means of humanitarian organizations by armed groups of different allegiances is well-known. The phenomenon of heavily militarized crime endogenous to the conflict increased over the past two years. It offers an ideal setting to mask all sorts of political actions; ideal crucible to melt the obscure, dangerous and unpredictable alloy between thieves and mercenaries.

As an example, more than 300 vehicles were stolen in Darfur in 2008 to NGOs and international peace keeping forces (UNAMID). In the months of May and June 2009 in the Vakaga region, a new mono-ethnic armed force thus operated three *car-jackings* with the help of Chadian mercenaries; the city of Birao (Prefecture of the Vakaga region) was then attacked twice in two weeks thanks to the help of Sudanese mercenaries this time. This new practice is

was then attacked twice in two weeks thanks to the help of Sudanese mercenaries this time. This new practice in CAR unfortunately augurs a deterioration of human condition and of the context of intervention for humanitarian workers. Resold or used locally, the stolen vehicles are used for the transportation of troops and are equipped by armed groups with tripods holding submachine guns or mortar. These lootings occur on the roads leading to the places where populations are gathered, or directly in the NGO offices during the day or at night. They are accompanied by systematic violence and humanitarian workers are directly threatened: some of our colleagues have thus been kidnapped for several days, violently hit, raped or even killed by their assailants.



*Sudanese rebels of the JEM – photography by UNAMID (UN)*

**The phenomenon of heavily militarized crime endogenous to the conflict increased over the past two years. (...) more than 300 vehicles were stolen in Darfur in 2008 to NGOs and international peace keeping forces**

This is the way the humanitarian space shrinks everyday in Darfur, in the Vakaga region, or in Chad; not that there is a decrease in needs, on the contrary; not that we lack the means either. But security related risks increase everyday. The access to the populations becomes more and more problematic, to the point that it is impossible to enter certain zones whereas civilians keep being the targets of violent and repeated attacks. Sometimes they even find themselves circled by multiple dangers and can't leave a zone where they are under assault, with no access to their land, deprived of water in terms of quality and quantity, with no possibility to supply their markets from the outside, roads being insecure. Crisis goes on and grows in spite of the available means of intervention. Humanitarian workers are reduced to seeking for more favourable possibilities to intervene and help populations who can do nothing else than wait or hit the road towards distant camps which access is uncertain.

Besides, the security stabilization of these zones by the multinational peace keeping forces (UNAMID in Sudan, MINURCAT in Chad and in CAR) is not efficient because of restrictive mandates; inaccessibility of entire sub-regions during the rainy season; or because of the bad state of the tracks, etc. The multiple ceasefires signed over the past years in each of these countries did not last, and the current perspectives of political resolution of the conflict are very shallow. These events will have heavy consequences on the long term, such as the explosion of urban spaces (350 000 displaced people in Nyala, 200 000 in El Fasher and in Abéché, etc.). Their new « inhabitants » do not have any capacity of social or economical integration, and the Youth lose the ancestral agricultural know-how. A transition is operating from nomad ways of living towards pastoralist ones. The ethnical tensions will probably last several generations.

**The access to the populations becomes more and more problematic, to the point that it is impossible to enter certain zones whereas civilians keep being the targets of violent and repeated attacks**

Today, civilian populations lost hold on their fate. Therefore, humanitarian actors have to react to the emergencies faced by the populations they have access to. In the Vakaga Region, a food crisis is brewing, and the 2009 rain season will probably be marked by a very limited access to the fields. Many displaced people in the eastern Chad can't have access to humanitarian help for security reasons, and in Darfur, numerous camps and isolated villages are today out of reach of humanitarian actions.



*Refugee camp of Um Dukhum. Photography by Didier Dematons*

If the future is highly uncertain in this Region, it is in the responsibility of Humanitarian actors to continue filling the space, maintaining help for the civil populations impacted by the armed conflicts surrounding and targeting them. We have to bet on the capacity of people to find answers to the conflicts striking them, and hope that the deterioration of the security conditions will not make this action impossible.

<sup>1</sup>The reading of « The Tormented Triangle : the regionalisation of conflict in Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic », J. Giroux, D. Lanz, D. Sguaitamatti, April 09 brings elements of analysis on this subject, and was the source of several historical elements of this article. It is available online on: [www.crisisstates.com](http://www.crisisstates.com)

<sup>2</sup>National Liberation Front of Chad

<sup>3</sup>Movement for Justice and Equality lead by Khalil Ibrahim

<sup>4</sup>Sudanese Liberation Army

<sup>5</sup>Convention for Justice and Peace



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### 1/ Second-hand markets / Garage sales Triangle G H – 2009

As every year, Triangle Génération Humanitaire organized two second-hand markets in Lyons, in order to get the city inhabitants to know better the NGO and to collect the funds necessary for the implementation of its projects worldwide. The totality of the benefits gathered during these events increases the resources of the association and contributes to the continuation and to the development of our international solidarity programmes.

This year marked the fifteenth time in Vaise (on May 30th and 31st, Ferber square, Market square and the Tanneurs esplanade) and the 7th time in Croix-Rousse (on June 6th 2009, Croix Rousse square and Boulevard). The latter increased in popularity and is becoming very well-known and appreciated by the Croix-Rousse inhabitants. The two second-hand markets draw every year more than 1 200 exhibitors, and several thousands of visitors.

The team of volunteers is formed by Bioforce trainees, the « integration through Humanitarian Action » Platform of Romans (PIHC) and by the salaried staff and members of Triangle G H. They are on the spot night and day to welcome the exhibitors and ensure the successful unfolding of the event.

Triangle GH makes an appointment with you for next year for the 16th time in Vaise and the 8th time in Croix-Rousse !



*Second-hand market in Croix-Rousse, June 6th 2009. Photography by Didier Dematons.*

### 2/ International Solidarity and Decentralized Cooperation Conferences (June 19th & 20th 2009)

« The world inspires us », Lyon June 19th-20th 2009

Within the framework of the *International Solidarity and Decentralized Cooperation Conferences in Rhône-Alpes*, Triangle introduced its integrated rural development project in the Province of Khammouane in Laos, a programme co-funded by the Region. Triangle and three other participants (in West Africa, Nicaragua and in Rhône-Alpes Region) initiated a debate among specialists of International Cooperation on the following theme: « From self-sufficiency to food sovereignty: with what meaning? Feed a population, a technical issue? » Calling into question intervention methods, assessment and analysis of the current programmes, those were the objectives of these experience sharing conferences.



Site : <http://www.rhonealpes.fr/402-assises-de-la-solidarite-internationale.htm>